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ABSTRACT 
The electric power industry has attracted much attention in the past decade following the 
movement toward deregulation. This movement has the potential to lead to greater profits 
for electricity producers and consumers. It requires a shift in thinking, however, as companies 
used to a regulated industry learn to treat electricity as an economic commodity. 
Economic markets are a complex area of study. Due to incomplete information and occa-
sional irrationality on the part of market participants, they have the potential to careen wildly 
away form theoretical predictions. Electric markets in particular, having been regulated for so 
long, ha~•e had a bumpy re-entry into the atmosphere of de-regulated capitalism. 
For all entities vested in the electric power industry, with this re-entry comes the need to 
protect themselves from risk as well as new opportunities for profit. This thesis explores the 
use of genetic algorithms to learn profit-maximizing strategies in a variety of simulated electric 
markets. 
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CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Electric power deregulation has been one of the major economic shifts to occur in recent 
years. This shift has focused mainly on replacing the regulated electric power industry with a 
competitive environment. This is based on the assumption that competition between profit-
seeking companies will lead to lower prices for consumers and a more e$icient economy in 
general. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 spells out the federal rules regarding this transition. 
Companies which in the past had a vertical monopoly now must deal with the risks of 
losing customers to competitors, lower demand than they were previously guaranteed, and 
the requirement of granting other companies access to one's own power lines. Of course, this 
transition has been less than smooth in some areas, such as California, in which the industry 
was partially deregulated and ended up costing companies much more than the regulated 
environment did. 
Part of the transition from regulation to competition involves setting up systems to treat 
electricity as a commodity. This includes determination of distribution of electricity from 
producers to consumers and determination of price paid for the electricity. Currently these 
factors are handled through the use of regional energy exchanges. In these exchanges, auctions 
are held in order to determine distribution and price. The auctions apply to multiple timescales: 
a monthly auction may determine distribution for each day in the month. Then aday-ahead 
daily auction may be held in order to finalize distribution for the next next day. Hourly auction 
would then be held on that day. 
Such exchanges behave similarly to exchanges that trade other commodities such as wheat 
or gold. However, the physical constraints placed on power plants by the laws of physics give 
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rise to unique considerations. For example, minimum and maximum quantities of electricity 
are available from each power-producing unit. Therefore, one must not be too quick to consider 
electricity as if it were like any other commodity. Production, transportation, and consumption 
of electricity all occur in non-trivially different ways than other commodities. 
1.2 Scope of This Work 
This works concerns itself primarily with the development of electric power market bidding 
strategies through the use of genetic algorithms. The bidding strategies were represented by 
two difi'erent modifications of a classical data processing structure known as a finite state 
automata. The genetic. algorithms used were varied as well, some incorporating asemi-fixed 
fitness function, and others using a co-evolutionary (population-specific) fitness function. 
Both types of fitness functions were based on maximizing profit in a competitive bidding 
situation. The only thing that changed was the choice of _bidders against which to play. The 
auctions that were held to determine profits and possibly losses were played in an iterative 
fashion. In other words, the same bidder would play the same opponents multiple times, in 
order to allow the bidding agents to learn their opponents' behavior and adjust their own 
behavior accordingly in order to maximize profit. 
Both of the representations were tested on each variation of experimental parameters. In 
addition, in the co-evolutionary setup, a third, very simple, representation was also run in for 
the sake of a comparison baseline for the other two representations, in order to show how their 
behavior compared with a "standard" solution. 
There are many possible auction scenarios imaginable that could be used to determine 
distribution of electricity. This work uses asingle-sided auction, but the work could easily be 
modified in order to accommodate adouble-sided auction or more complex auctions. 
1.3 organization of This Work 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the existing research literature relevant to this work. It con-
cerns itself with literature primarily discussing two areas: bidding in electric power markets 
3 
and genetic algorithms as applied to economic games. Included in the discussion of electric 
power markets are .the areas of market design, market simulation, optimization, genetic al-
gorithms, and reinforcement learning. This discussion of genetic algorithm literature reviews 
three economic games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, Divide the Dollar, and the Public Investment 
Game. 
Chapter 3 discusses the theory behind the economic markets and genetic algorithms. It 
gives justifications for the choices of market parameters used, such as price and cost determi-
nation. It also gives justification for the choices of parameters used in the genetic algorithms, 
such as choices of representations used. Finally, it explains the parameters that were varied in 
order to create the different experiments producing the data in chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 gives the experiments that were run and the results of each experiment. It also 
interprets briefly the results of each set of experiments. 
Chapter 5 gives conclusions based on the results in chapter 4. It also discusses future 
research that could be done in this area. 
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter reviews work in the field of economic auctions, particularly as applied to 
electric power markets. It also presents research in the field of genetic algorithms applied to 
economic topics such as auctions and other economic games. 
Much of the auction research varies in the specific auction design employed. This is due to 
the disparity in auction rules used in different regions throughout the world, as well as different 
simplifying assumptions made on the part of the researchers. 
2.1 Electric Power Market Bidding 
2.1.1 Market Design 
Contreras, et al., in {Contreras0l), compare different implementations of electric market 
designs. Specifically, they explain the differences between single-round and multi-round auc-
tions, in terms of maximization of social welfare, computational cost, resultant market prices, 
etc. They reach the conclusion that iterative bidding (multi-round auctions) are not advisable 
for use in day-ahead markets. 
Sheble, in (Sheble96), proposes details for the rules governing deregulated electric markets. 
He defines and lays out rules for the interaction of the electric commodity market and its 
various derivatives markets, such as the futures market, options market, and swap market. 
He also proposes breaking the trading into periods (hours, weeks, months), and bidding on 
production of electricity during these periods. Allocation already determined for a larger period 
(e.g. monthly) would constrain the possible allocation for smaller periods (e.g. weekly). 
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2.1.2 Market Simulation 
Otero-Novas, et al., in (Otero-Novas00}, discuss the simulation of a wholesale electricity 
market, called COMSEE, based on Wilson's rules proposed for the power exchange in the 
Californian market (Wilson97} . These rules are: 
1. The price cannot be increased. 
2. The price can be decreased only if the new price is less than the clearing price in the 
previous iteration by at least a specified price decrement (e.g. X1.00 or X0.10/1~~IWh). 
This new price is said to "improve" the previous price. 
3. The price cannot improve any previous clearing price not improved at the first opportu-
pity. 
They use these rules to simulate a perfectly competitive market, by considering each gen-
erator to be independent entities seeking to maximize personal profit. They also simulate an 
oligopolistic market in v~-hich each firm coordinates the bids of its own units to maximize total 
profit . 
2.1.3 Optimization 
Weber and Overbye, in (Weber99), modelled the problem of bidding in an electric power 
market as a two-level optimization problem. The two levels of optimization consist of the 
problem of determining an optimal bid (first level) under the constrasnt that the price and 
dispatch quantity are determined by an optimal power flow (OPF) optimization (second level) . 
This thesis assumes that the OPF problem is solved outside of the market simulation and 
.embeds the solutions to the OPF into the generators' cost curves. 
Song, et al., in (Song99), optimize bidding strategies by use of a Markov decision process. 
The Markov decision process used is similar to the finite state machine representation in 
use in this thesis, but with transitions between states determined stochastically instead of 
deterministically. 
6 
2.1.4 Genetic Algorithms 
Richter and Sheble, in (Richter98), used a genetic algorithm to develop bidding strategies 
for an electric power double auction. This used a representation based on evolving bid multi-
pliers, or a .number multiplied by the producer's marginal cost (or the buyer's marginal utility) 
to get the bid to make. 
Richter, et al., in (Richter99), used genetic algorithms to evolve bidding strategies in a 
double auction for electric power. They conducted two experiments. One used genetic pro-
gramming, or the evolution of parse trees, to evolve the bidding strategies. The other approach 
was to use GP-Automata to represent the bidding strategies. 
2.1.5 Reinforcement Learning 
Wu, et al ., in (Wu02), introduced a machine learning algorithm to learn to bid in electric 
power maxkets. It is general enough to apply to any market, but they tested it specifically on 
a single-sided auction with discriminatory pricing. 
Petrov and Sheble, in (Petrov0l); used the generic Roth-Erev learning algorithm ((RothErev95) 
and (ErevRoth95)) to learn e$ective bidding strategies for a double auction for electric power. 
They pointed out that the algorithm in its original form was unsuited to learning when profits 
were at or near 0. They modified the algorithm to account for this deficiency and thereby 
allowed it to learn much more quickly and efficiently. 
2.2 Evolving Strategies to Play Simple Economic Games 
Much of economic game theory is concerned with finding Nash Equilibria (Nash50). A Nash 
Equilibrium is a set of strategies, one strategy played by each player, with the property that no 
player can increase its payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy. Given certain assumptions, 
then all players should converge to that equilibrium. Some of these assumptions, however, are 
not met in practice: the game must have a unique Nash Equilibrium, all players must have 
perfect information and behave rationally (i.e. choose the best strategy once they know what 
it is). 
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2.2.1 Prisoner's Dilemma 
The standard Prisoner's Dilemma game is a two-player non-zero-sum game. Each player 
makes a choice to "cooperate" or "defect" . If both cooperate, both receive a payoff of 3. If 
both defect, both receive a payoff of 1. If one cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator 
recei ves a payoff of 0, and the defector receives a payoff of 5. 
Standard economic theory shows that the standard prisoner's dilemma game has a Nash 
equilibrium in which both players defect. In other words, if both players have chosen to 
defect, neither can increase its payoff by changing its strategy. However, in any other state, 
in which one or both of the players cooperates, a higher payoff can be achieved by changing 
one's strategy• to defect instead. In this respect, the choice "defect" is said to dominate choice 
"cooperate~ . Therefore, one would expect any agent learning to play the prisoner's dilemma 
to learn quickly that defecting is the optimal action, despite the higher payoff possible if both 
cooperate. 
A ~•ariant of the prisoner's dilemma is called the iterated prisoner's dilemma. In this game, 
two pla~•ers play multiple rounds of the prisoner's dilemma against each other. Axelrod evolved 
finite state machines to play the iterated prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod87). He found that when 
given the opportunity to play multiple rounds, agents will often learn to cooperate with one 
another in order to get the higher payoff that results when both players cooperate. However, 
the~~ require a more complex strategy than simply "always cooperate," lest they be taken 
ad~~nt age of by more malicious players. Hence the choice to encode strategies as finite state 
automata rather than simply as a single action to take. 
This experiment has relevance to the current work in two respects. First, the market being 
simulated is a complex, multi-round economic game. Second, finite state automata are being 
used to encode the strategies for playing this game. It is important that subsequent rounds of 
play be against the same opponents in order for the strategies to have any meaning. Otherwise, 
there is no such concept as reaction to an opponent's actions, because the opponent will not 
be the same the next time one meets him. 
It is of interest to determine which Prisoner's Dilemma strategies axe evolutionarily stable. 
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An evolutionarily stable strategy is one that, given that it is in use across the entire population, 
cannot be "invaded" by another strategy. To be invaded is to be beaten consistently so as to be 
driven out of the population by virtue having a lower fitness than the invading strategy. It has 
been shown that no pure (deterministic). strategy is completely evolutionarily stable (Boyd87) . 
However, many strategies, such as Tit-For-Tat (TFT), are stable against almost all invading 
strategies, and the strategies that successfully invade TFT are themselves very unstable. 
The iterated prisoner's dilemma has also been studied by Wagner, et al., in (Wagner00} . 
They analyzed the effect of strategy representation on the evolution of cooperation in playing 
iterated prisoner's dilemma, investigating finite state machines, plain logical formulas, logical 
formulas with a time delay operation, If-Skip-Action(ISAc) lists, Markov chains, and neural 
networks. 
Mayfield and Ashlock, in (Mayfield98), discovered anon-trivial effect of evolution. FSM's 
were evolved for 1000 generations, more than long enough for fitness to converge, and the 
population was saved. The FSM's were then evolved for an additional 9000 generations, with 
no apparent change in fitness. However, when the FSM's from generation 10000 were played 
against the FSM's from generation 1000, the former achieved much higher fitness than the 
latter. This effect, in which a population evolves for a very long time with no apparent change 
in fitness, but is able to build up general skills in achieving high fitness, has casually been 
called the Mayfield E, f,~ect. 
2.2.2 Divide the Dollar 
Ashlock, in (Ashlock97}, evolved GP-Automata to play a simple game known as Eivide 
tie Eollar. In this game, two players bid a monetary amount. If the sum is less than or 
equal to a dollar, they each receive their bid amount, otherwise they each receive zero. This 
is an interesting game to study theoretically because it has a continuum of Nash Equilibria 
corresponding to real number solutions to the equation a -}- b = 1, where a is the first player's 
bid and b is the second player's bid. This means there are an infinite number of Nash equilibria, 
and so predicting how the game will end up being played is difficult theoretically. It turns out 
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that GP-Automata ended up converging to a population in which every player bid just under 
X0.50. 
A study similar to (Wagner00) was conducted by Leahy and Ashlock (Leahy00). In this 
work they investigated the effects of representation choice on evolving agents to play the Divide 
the Dollar game. They used artificial neural nets, lookup tables, real valued mathematical 
formulae, integer valued formulae modulo 101, and GP-Automata to represent strategies. 
2.2.3 Public Investment Garne 
Ashlock, in (Ashlock0l), studied a simple evolutionary algorithm that played a population 
against itself in the Public Investment Game. In this game, multiple bidders submit a sealed bid 
between ~0 and X100. The sum total that they invested is then doubled and distributed evenly 
among the bidders. This game attempts to model publicly funded utilities, such as roads 
requiring maintenance, in which everyone gets nothing if no one contributes, but the total 
effect on the group is negligible if only a single bidder lowers its contribution. This game's 
Nash equilibrium consists of every player making a bid of 0, and that is exactly the result that 
Ashlock observed after a few generations of evolution. He was able to achieve higher payoffs 
by introducing "laws" (minimum required investment levels) and "fines" (penalties subtracted 
from payoffs) for evading the laws. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
This chapter describes the setup of the experiments performed and gives background in-
formation necessary to understand the nature of these experiments. 
3.1 Introduction 
Background information is given here on both electric power markets and genetic algo-
rithms. 
3.1.1 Electric Power Markets 
Electric power prices in the marketplace are determined for the most part by single-sided 
auctions. Generation companies (GENCOs) produce power and consumers buy power for con-
sumption. Typically, energy service companies (ESCOs) consolidate demand from a group of 
consumers, so that GENCOs do not deal with individual electricity consumers. Z~ansmission 
companies (TRANSCOs) own the power lines and axe paid to transport electricity from one 
physical location to another. Ancillary services are provided by ancillary companies (ANCIL-
COs). An Energy Mercantile Association (EMA) serves as a buffer between producers and 
consumers, or a market maker. Figure 3.1 shows the interconnection between these entities. 
(Kumar96) Note that the value chain is different from the physical chain. The physical chain 
refers the the actual transportation of power from the producer to the final consumer. The 
value chain refers to the flow of money that is paid for this power, which involves extra entities 
that do not themselves necessarily consume, transport, or produce power. 
The EhiIA holds asingle-sided auction on either side. It will estimate demand from con-









Figure 3.1 Electricity Marketplace 
Customer 
take the electricity it bought and turn around and hold an auction taking bids from consumers, 
who buy the electricity. This paper models the former auction, in which sellers, assumed to 
consist of competing. GEI`TCOs, make bids to sell power and must then produce the amount 
they agreed to sell. The simulations could just as easily be applied to a buyer's auction. 
The purpose of an auction is to expose information about buyers' and sellers' respective 
willingness to pay or sell. Commodities like electricity often have no explicit fixed worth; their 
worth is a function of the current market conditions, and an auction attempts to find this 
worth (McAfee87} . Essentially, an auction allows discovery of the equilibrium price, defined 
as the intersection of the demand and supply curves of the buyers and sellers, respectively. 
In this case the demand curve will be a straight line, as the EMA will estimate demand as a 
single fixed quantity. 
According to economic theory, in the long run all profits should go to zero as sellers underbid 
each other in the marketplace. This prediction is disrupted, however, by any number of factors 
that appear in a real marketplace: cost curves that do not pass through the origin, capacity 
limits on generation quantity due to physical limitations of generators, and irrational behavior 
on the part of market participants. The most disruptive factor that leads to violation of 
theoretical predictions is information uncertainty on the part of market participants. 
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3.1.2 Genetic Algorithms 
A genetic algorithm is a type of evolutionary algorithm. An evolutionary algorithm is an 
algorithm that uses the biological paradigm of evolution to solve mathematical problems. Many 
researchers in the field will disagree on definitions and terms. Part of this is due to confusion 
in the use of borrowed biological terms whose original definition is somewhat obscured by their 
use in evolutionary algorithm descriptions. What follows is as close to a common description 
of the field as possible. 
3.1.2.1 Evolutionary and Genetic Algorithms 
An evolutionary algorithm is any algorithm that follows the Ioop given in figure 3.2. 
1. Create an initial population of potential solutions 
2. Evaluate the fitness of the population 
3. Repeat 
4. Select pairs from the population to be parents, with a fitness bias 
5. Copy the parents to make children 
6. Perform crossover on the children (optional) 
7. Mutate the resulting children 
8. Place the nea~ structures in the population 
9. Evaluate the fitness of the new structures 
10. Until Done 
Figure 3.2 Basic Evolutionary Algorithm Loop 
Each iteration of this loop is known as a generation. A solution (also called a creature 
or agent) in Figure 3.2 refers to some reasonable ("reasonable" being defined by the problem 
at hand) encoding of potential solutions to a problem. A subset of evolutionary algorithms, 
known as genetic algorithms, is the most prevalent and is the type used in the simulations 
described in this paper. These algorithms always execute line 6 of the basic evolutionary 
algorithm loop, which performs crossover. Crossover is the process of exchanging subsets of 
representations between two solutions. This mimics the process of sexual reproduction, as two 
parent solutions are copied and their children crossed over. Often genetic algorithms are defined 
to operate on fixed data structures. This is primarily to distinguish them from another type 
of independently developed evolutionary algorithm known as genetic programming (Koza92). 
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Genetic programming uses the loop shown in figure 3.2 to evolve parse trees (a variable-sized 
representation) to solve problems. However, it is possible to evolve data structures which are 
neither parse trees nor have a fixed size. Such an algorithm will also be termed a genetic 
algorithm in this paper. 
In addition to crossover, the solution space is explored through the use of mutation, the 
process of randomly perturbing solutions. This mimics the biological process of random genetic 
mutation in creatures of a living population, which occasionally give the creature an advantage 
over others. 
A fctness ,function, which numerically evaluates the optimality of a solution, must also be 
defined. Whatever scheme is used to select the parents, it always biases selection toward those 
creatures with higher fitness. It may also bias replacement of creatures toward those that are 
less fit . This mimics the biological process of natural selection, in which more fit creatures are 
more likely to survive and pass on their genes to offspring, while Iess fit creatures die off. 
3.1.2.2 Representation 
To develop solutions to a problem using a genetic algorithm, the potential solutions must 
be encodable in such a way that allows mutation, crossover, and fitness evaluation. Two 
different, but related, encodings were used to represent bidders in an auction. Each is a 
generalization of an information processing structure known as a finite state machine (FSM) 
or finite .state a~ctomaton (FSA) . The first extension is 'known as a GP-Automaton, and the 
second is known as aNeural-Automaton. GP-Automata were first introduced by Ashlock in 
(Ashlock97). Neural-Automata are introduced here by the author for reasons explained in the 
description of Neural-Automata. 
A finite state machine is a theoretical data processing structure. It takes input from some 
external source, changes its internal state in response to the input, and may or may not produce 
an output, known as a response. Mathematically, it is a directed graph, with each node called 
a state. Each state has associated with it a transition table. The transition table enumerates 
all possible inputs and states, for each input, what response to give and to what state to 
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transition. Each directed edge in the graph, therefore, represents a transition from one state 
to another, and each edge's satellite data consists of an input that triggered the transition and 
a response to output. The FSM receives inputs sequentially, each time transitioning to a new 
state and outputting a response. Each transition has only one response in the model used in 
this paper, though in theory there could be more than one transition between two states, each 
with a difi'erent input and response. An FSM also has an initial state and an initial response, 
since it must start somewhere before it receives its first input. All computer programs may be 
thought of as finite state machines with memory. 
Finite state machines are good structures to evolve, as the division of functionality into 
discrete states and transitions allow for natural choices of crossover operators. Finite state 
machines have been evolved to play simple economic games such as the Iterated Prisoner's 
Dilemma (Axelrod87) and as control structures for virtual robots (Ashlock00). 
Because all possible inputs must be enumerated, FSM's are impractical to use on problems 
that have a large number of inputs. Even a single unbounded input renders the number of 
possible inputs infinite. Since the actual amount of information carried in the input tends 
actuallti• to be much smaller, bandwidth compression is performed on the data. Bandwidth 
compression is a term borrowed from communications, and it refers to reducing the resources 
needed to represent some data. In this case, the bandwidth of the input data needs to be 
compressed to the set of integers in the range [O,number of states - 1], since this is the maximum 
number of possible transitions possible from any state. 
Some method must be used to map all possible inputs into an integer in the range [O,number 
of states - 1~ . GP-Automata and Neural-Automata provide two different methods of accom-
plishing this bandwidth compression. 
3.1.2.3 GP-Automata 
GP-Automata (GPA) have been described as a combination of genetic algorithms and 
genetic programming (hence the "GP-" , for genetic programming) . Each state in a GPA 
replaces the transition table with a parse tree whose input nodes are the external inputs to the 
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FSM. When a GPA iterates (takes an input and decides what to do) it runs the input through 
the parse tree at the current state. The parse tree outputs an integer, and the parity of this 
integer is used to determine the next state transition. Therefore, only two distinct transitions 
may be made from any state. 
During evolution, the parse trees axe modified according to the standard mutation and 
crossover operators used on parse trees in genetic programming. The exact details are given 
later. 
Start: 130.651 ~2 
If Even If Odd Deciders 
0 254.072-->2 160.181 2 (~ (ITE -2 2 (Odd -1))) 
1 116.981—>2 138.538 5 (ITE xl (Odd 0) (Odd 2)) 
2 208.9910 124.01 4 (Odd (N (ITE 0 2 xl))) 
3 67.2954—+6 165.088 1 (N (min (> 2 1) xl)) 
4 165.586—~7 200.285-->4 (ITE (Odd 0) 0 (N -1)) 
5 237.8-->7 51.2287—~3 (Com (ITE xl 0 (~ xl))) 
6 142.16—>7 39.2616 1 (ITE xl (Com ~1) (Odd 0)) 
7 141.045—>7 151.488 2 (Com (Com (Odd (= xl 0)))) 
Figure 3.3 Example 8-state GP-Automata 
Figure 3.4 Example Parse Tree 
Figure 3.3 shows an example GP-Automata with 8 states. The top line represents the 
initial response on the left side of the arrow, and the initial state on the right side of the arrow. 
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Likewise, the response and next state are shown for each state under the labels "If Even" 
and "If Odd" . The "Deciders" are the parse trees used to decide next-state transitions and 
responses. The parse trees axe shown in a LISP-like notation. Figure 3.4 shows a parse tree 
in a graphical notation. The tree in figure 3.4 would output the value 13. ITE is if-then-else, 
and would evaluate the subtree on the left to false, since 3 > 4 is false. If it were true, it 
would output the middle child node, 5, but since it is false, ITE outputs the left child node, 
6 + 7 = 13. 
3.1.2.4 Neural-Automata 
While the GP-Automata scheme has the advantage of being adaptable to an arbitrary 
number of states, it has the disadvantage that each state may contain at most two next-
state transitions. Such an FSM is strictly less expressive than an FSM that allows arbitrary 
transitions from any state to any other state. A proof of this follows. 
Suppose we wish to design an FSM that takes nickels, dimes, or quarters as input and 
outputs a "1" if at least 15 cents have been entered cumulatively and outputs a "0" otherwise. 
The initial state would correspond to 0 cents being entered so far. After the first coin, either 
5, 10, or 25 cents will be the total. Since 25 > 15, but 5 < 15 and 10 < 15, the next 
state transition corresponding to a quarter being entered must be different from the transition 
resulting from the other two coins, since a quarter should cause a response of "1" , and the 
other two should cause a response of "0" . Since we allow only 2 transitions per state, then 
if either a nickel or a dime is entered, the FSM must end up in the same state regardless of 
which was entered. 
If a dime was entered, then no matter what coin is input the next time, the cumulative 
total will be equal to or exceed 15 cents, and the FSM must therefore output a "1" . However, 
if a nickel was entered the first time, then the total may or may not exceed 15 cents, depending 
on the second coin entered. However, since the first coin sends the FSM to the same state 
whether the input was a nickel or a dime, there is a contradiction. To handle the second coin, 
there must exist 3 possible states to go to from either the initial state or the second state. 
1? 
Limiting the number of next state transitions to 2 renders the FSM incapable of executing this 
function. However, an FSM with no limit on transitions could easily execute this function. 
Therefore an FSM with only 2 next state transitions per state is strictly less expressive than 
a general FSM. 
Neural-automata filter the input data while allowing an arbitrary number of next-state 
transitions. Instead of a parse tree, aneural-automata uses afeed-forward neural net at each 
state to decide the next state transition. The output node of the neural net uses a sigmoid 
transfer function 
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1 + e- ~ 
where x is the weighted sum of the inputs. The output of this function is bounded in the 
range [0,1~. Therefore any number in the range [0 ,number of states - 1] can be acquired by 
multiplying the output of the neural net by the number of states and truncating the result. 
Furthermore, since afeed-forward neural net with two hidden layers is capable of approximating 
any mathematical function (see (Cybenko88)), it is capable of approximating the expressive 
power of a parse tree. 
3.2 Market Setup 
A variety of experiments were performed. In each case, where applicable, three different 
representations were evolved. GP-Automata and Neural-Automata were each evolved with a 
genetic algorithm. The third representation was simply an ordered pair of real numbers (p, q), 
which represented a constant bid to make. The reason for introducing this representation is 
discussed shortly. 
The market consisted of an auctioneer, representing the EMA, and any number of bidders, 
representing the competing generation companies. The auction proceeds as follows: 
3.2.1 Auction Process 
The auction process is shown in figure 3.5. The auctioneer announces a demand to be 



















Figure 3.5 Auction Process 
no 
quantity, q. Market clearing then follows. These bids are sorted in ascending order by price. 
They are then accepted sequentially, adding 'the quantity of each bid to a running total until 
this total meets the demand. At this point no more bids are accepted, and the last one is 
accepted for only the amount of demand that remained, not for the total quantity given in the 
bid. 
After market clearing, price discovery is tested. The condition used for price discovery in 
these experiments was whether at least 50% of the bids were accepted. If price discovery did not 
occur, new bids are taken and the market is cleared again. The results of the previous bids and 
market clearing are forgotten and do not affect profits. One round of bid submission and market 
clearing is termed a cycle. If after ten cycles, price discovery still has not occurred, typically 
the results of the. last market clearing would be accepted. In these experiments, however, the 
the profits of all. bidders was simply zeroed, in order to introduce selective pressure to make 
bids conducive to price discovery. 
Once price discovery occurs, the bids are committed, and contracts axe written. Now any 
bidder whose bid was accepted is ,obligated to provide the quantity of electricity accepted. If 
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the total quantity accepted did not meet demand, then another auction is held with demand 
revised to be the previous demand minus the quantity accepted in the last auction. If after 
ten auctions, demand has not been met, then no more auctions axe held. 
3.2.2 Price and Cost Determination 
There are two methods implemented in determining the price each bidder is paid. The 
actual money gained is the price the bidder is paid tunes the quantity accepted. The first is 
simply to pay the bidder the price it gave on its bid, known as discriminatory pricing. The 
second is to give it the market clearing price, defined as the price submitted by the last bidder 
whose bid was accepted. This is known as uniform pricing. The reasoning behind this is that 
the uniform market clearing price is the equilibrium price, or the price at which the supply 
curve crosses the demand curve. 
Cost determination is modelled by a quadratic function of quantity, a common scheme for 
approximating the cost of producing electricity (Wood96) . Each generation company may own 
more than one generator. HoR-ever, once a generation company has a quantity it has commit-
ted to deliver, there are constrained optimization techniques, such as the use of Lagrangian 
multipliers, that can be used to find the optimal power production from each generator. That 
optimization is not explicitly performed in this simulation, and the total cost to a generation 
company to produce a given quantity is modelled as a single quadratic function of quantity. 
This is a simplifying assumption. In a real situation, any number of optimization techniques 
such as LaGrangian Relaxation, could be used to find the actual optimal power production 
for each unit. These optimizations would take into account the fact that a power plant may 
operate more than one unit, and that these units not only produce electricity at different costs, 
but are connected to transmission lines that charge different amounts to transport electricity. 
Also, Real Options could be used to take the uncertainty due to different factors such as 
uncertainty about an opponent's bid, uncertainty about future demand, and uncertainty about 
future failures and inefficiencies in power plant operation, and uncertainty about congestion 
on transmission lines, and reduce all these uncertainties to a single number ??. This approach 
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uses the mathematical tools traditionally used to value financial options, such as call and put 
orders, to analyze the monetary worth of options in real life.. 
In this work, each power producer was treated as if it had a single unit that had a sin-
gle quadratic cost curve. This differs from previous work done in this area, in which the 
optimization was performed explicitly. 
The total profit made by a seller after an auction is (price paid) * (quantity delivered) —
(cost to deliver quantity) . If more than one auction is held, total profit is the sum of the profits 
from each auction. All the auctions needed to meet demand are termed one round of auctions. 
In the genetic algorithms, 24 rounds of auctions would be held against the same opponents 
for fitness evaluation, summing the total profit from each auction round. The number 24 was 
chosen to correspond with the 24 hourly auctions held in a single day. In the next generation, 
different opponents would be played, but the same opponents would always be played over the 
course of the 24 rounds of auctions. 
The auctions being simulated in this work are representing day-ahead (forward) markets 
for electricity. This is why the auctioneer must estimate demand. The auction is held to 
determine distribution for each hour of the following day. In reality, an hourly auction would 
be held the next day in order to cover the difference between the estimated demand (which 
this forward market is designed to cover) and the actual demand (which may end up being 
different from the predicted value) . 
3.3 Experiment s 
3.3.1 Variable Parameters 
There were a number of choices to be made concerning the implementation of a genetic al-




Two different representations were evolved using a genetic algorithm, GP-Automata and 
Neural-Automata. In the discussion of FSMs previously, it was stated that they produce a 
response, but exactly what this response consists of was not covered. In these experiments, 
the response was an ordered pair (p, q), representing a bid price and bid quantity to submit. 
At the beginning of the 24 rounds of bidding, the FSMs would be reset (internal state set to 
initial state and initial response taken as first bid). After that, the each bidder would update 
its internal state and output the appropriate response in each subsequent auction. Note that 
because more than one cycle per auction may occur in order to achieve price discovery, and 
more than one auction may occur in order to meet demand for one round, there may be more 
than 2-~ bids taken from each bidder in one fitness evaluation. 
The inputs fed to each FSM, after the first bid, were: 
• Preti•ious high bid 
• Pre~•ious low bid 
• Pre~•ious average bid 
• Bidder's own previous bid 
• Pre~•ious number of bids accepted 
• Demand remaining to be met 
• Quantity that the bidder has agreed to deliver so far 
For each argument that is a bid, the FSM was actually fed two real numbers: the price and 
the quantit`• of the bid. "High" bid and "Iow" bid refer to the bid with the highest and lowest 
price. respectively, not the highest and lowest quantity. The "demand remaining to be met" 
refers to residual demand left over if an auction is held, all bids were accepted, and demand 
was not met. Since another auction will be held, agents need to know what the new demand 
is. 
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Additionally, a third representation was "evolved." This was simply an ordered pair (p, q}, 
which represented a constant bid to make. However, crossover was not performed, and so this 
was not really a genetic algorithm. The bid was simply mutated every generation by adding 
Gaussian noise to each of the numbers in the bid. 
The algorithm to develop these constant bids was therefore more of a population-based 
stochastic search algorithm. This is an algorithm which starts with a population of initial 
random solutions and perturbs each slightly with random noise, keeping and copying more 
optimal solutions over those that were less successful. The population was initialized with 
random bids, and at each "generation" the most fit half of the population replaced the least 
fit half of the population. Each newly copied bid was then perturbed by Gaussian noise. 
The reason for using this. representation was two-fold: to test the dynamics of the market, 
and to reject the null hypothesis that evolution of more complex FSM-based strategies is no 
better than random guessing. Initially, when debugging the simulated marketplace, the author 
needed to see if it would match the predictions of economic theory under perfect conditions, 
and how exactly the market would be affected by imperfect conditions. This representation 
should conform to theoretical predictions that say which single bid is optimal given bidders 
who attempt to maximize profit. Deviance from theoretical predictions would then point to a 
flaw in the implementation of the simulated marketplace or a theoretical assumption not being 
upheld. This aids in understanding the behavior of the more complex strategies in the same 
simulated environment. 
3.3.1.2 Co-evolution vs. Fixed Fitness vs. Immortality 
In general, fitness functions in evolutionary algorithn1s can be divided into two classes: 
co-evolutionary and fixed. A fixed fitness function evaluating one member of a population 
is independent of the other members of the population. A co-evolutionary fitness function 
evaluating the s~sne member will give different results depending on the other members of the 
population. For example, a genetic algorithm evolving strategies to play chess might evaluate 
fitness by having the creatures play an expert alpha beta strategy such as the one programmed 
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into Deep Blue, IBM's grand champion chess-playing computer. This would be a fixed fitness 
function. The algorithm might alternately evaluate fitness by simply playing the strategies 
against each other in a round-robin tournament and averaging the scores. This would be a 
co-evolutionary fitness function. 
The marketplace simulated has agents which are not identical to one another, the difference 
being that they have different production cost curves. Therefore, one is not as concerned 
with how an agent might perform against another agent like it, .but how it would perform 
in a marketplace with agents different from it. The co-evolutionary strategy used therefore 
requires a bit of a re -definition (which actually brings it closer to the original definition in 
biology). Instead of evolving one population of agents, one population for each of the number 
of bidders in the market is evolved. When breeding is done each generation, members from a 
population are bred only with members from the same population. When fitness evaluation 
happens, however, the fitness of a member of a population depends only on members from 
the other populations, because the agent bids only against one member from each of the other 
populations. This is actually closer to the biological notion of co-evolution, in which two species 
are said to co-evolve with one another if "a change in one species acts as a new selective force 
on another species, and counteradaptation by the second species, in turn, affects selection on 
individuals in the first." (Campbell87) 
A method of introducing a fixed fitness function when no external one exists is possible in 
cases where the agents being evolved play against each other. First, evolve using co-evolution 
for a certain number of generations. Then pick the best members of the population and "im-
mortalize" (save) them. The fitness function now becomes the profits attained by playing 
against the immortal strategies, instead of playing against each other. A ratcheted immortal-
izing fitness function can be used as well. This involves immortalizing the best members of the 
population every n generations. Fitness is determined by playing all the sets of agents that 
have been immortalized so far. To account for space considerations, ashortcut may be used, 
such as "play the last 5 immortalized sets of agents." For example, if n = 1000, and we are on 
generation 8500, the fitness would be determined by playing the best agents from generations 
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4000, 5000, 6000, 7000, and 8000. 
This sounds similar to elitism, but this is a distinct concept. An elite genetic algorithm 
is one in which at least one member of the current population is guaranteed to be a part of 
the population in the next generation. In other words, there is no way for the children of 
breeding to replace all the members of the population. However, this elite group differs from 
the immortal group introduced here in a number of ways. First, the immortal group is not 
considered when breeding. Only non-immortal members of the population can breed to create 
children. Secondly, the immortal group is the fitness function. An elite group in a normal 
genetic algorithm has no special role in the fitness function. Finally, the immortal group is 
the same from one generation to the next, unless explicitly replaced. The elite "group" in 
the normal genetic algorithm, however, is defined by the current population. Usually an elite 
member is one with the highest fitness. However, it may not have the highest fitness during 
subsequent generations. 
3.3.1.3 Uniform vs Discriminatory Pricing 
Under uniform pricing, alI "winners" (bidders whose bids were accepted) pay the same 
amount. In the simplest case, this amount is the market clearing price, the highest price that 
was accepted. The theoretical justification for this is that the highest accepted price in an 
auction is the price at which the supply curve would intersect the demand curve. This is the 
equilibrium price, which is the price that all trades should be made at in a perfectly competitive 
market. 
Under discriminatory pricing, winners pay ciif~erent amounts. In the simplest case, this 
amount is the price they bid. In any auction where there is more than one winner, this would 
give more money to the auctioneer at the expense of the sellers. However, it would also tend 
to inflate the bids above the bidders' marginal costs, which may actually lead to less profit for 
the seller in the long run. 
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3.3.1.4 Number of Bidders 
In a market with few bidders, each bidder has more market power. Bidders with market 
power have enough influence to affect the outcome of the auction. In a uniform pricing scheme, 
one would say they have the power to change the price. In the context of an auction, the most 
immediate effect of having few bidders is that it becomes easy for bidders to cooperate with 
each other and raise prices by raising their bids. Alternately, a bidder could withhold capacity 
in order to drive the price up and undercut it later. 
3.3.1.5 Cost Curves and Capacity Limits 
Different producers will have different generation cost curves. This models the real world 
fact that some electricity producers are coal-driven, some are oiI-driven, some are nuclear, 
some have many generators, and some may only have one. They also have different capacity 
limits, or minimum and maximum quantities that they axe able to produce. This models the 
physical limitations of power plants. The fact that different bidders have different cost curves 
and capacity limits is the motivation behind separating the genetic algorithm into separate 
populations. Each population represents a different type of producer and is evolving to get 
better at bidding under the constraint of its own cost curve and capacity limits. Note that 
previous studies in this area assumed that all power producers had similar cost curves and 
capacity limits. 
3.3.2 Genetic Algorithm Parameters 
There are many generic parameters of genetic algorithms. Some, such as mutation and 
crossover operators, seriously affect the outcome of the algorithm. Some, such as population 
size and number of generations, are merely tweaked according to the problem at hand, usually 
by making them as big as possible while allowing for the program to finish running in a 
reasonable amount of time. 
Unless noted otherwise, these experiments used a population size of 32 and ran for 1000 
generations. The model of evolution (method of breeding creatures with high fitness) used for 
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the GP-Automata and Neural-Automata is known as single tournament selection. See figure 
3.6 for a diagram showing how single tournament selection works. 
Creatures before Breeding 
Creature Fitness 
Creature 1 6 
Creature ~ 5 




Creature 5 7 
Creature 6 1 
Creature 7 2 
Creature 8 3 
Creatuues after Breeding 
Creature Fitness 
Creature 1 6 
Child of 1 and 3 ? 
Creature 3 7 
Child of 1 and 3 ? 
Creature 5 7 
Child of 5 and $ ? 
Child of 5 and 8 ? 
Creature 8 3 
Figure 3.6 Single Tournament Selection of Size 4 
In this model of evolution, the population is divided into sets of four creatures. Within each 
set of four, the two most fit are picked as parents. They are then bred (copied, crossed over, and 
then mutated) and their children replace the two least fit. Since the fixed-bid representation 
did not use a genetic algorithm, in each "generation" the most fit half of the population would 
replace the least fit half, and then the newly copied agents would be "mutated" . 
The mutation and crossover operators depended on the representation. For both of the 
FSM-based representations, there were a number of possible mutation and crossover operators 
that could be chosen. Each was assigned a probability and picked to be the mutation or 
crossover operator with that probability. The mutation rate was a number between 0 and 1 
that correlated with the severity of mutation. If the number of possible mutation operators 
was given by m, and the mutation rate given by r, then m * r mutations would be performed on 
each child in each generation. Each mutation, the probability of picking any of the individual 
mutation operators remained the same. 
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3.3.2.1 Fixed Bid Mutation 
Since the fixed bid representation did not use a genetic algorithm, there is no crossover 
to speak of. However, it randomly perturbed the bid between each fitness evaluation, like 
a mutation. Both the price and quantity were perturbed by Gaussian noise with standard 
deviation equal to maximum O minimum Recall that the minimum and maximum price were 0 and 
120, respectively, and the minimum and maximum quantity depended on the capacity limits 
of the producer. 
3.3.2.2 GP-Automata Mutation 
The GP-Automata mutation operator selected one of the mutation operators listed in table 
3.1. 
Table 3.1 GP-Automata Mutation Operators 
Probability Mutation 
0.1 Change initial state 
0.1 Perturb initial response 
0.2 Change a state transition 
0.2 Change a response 
0.1 New decider parse tree 
0.1 Crossover two decider parse trees 
0.1 Exchange two decider parse trees 
0.1 Copy one decider parse tree over another 
A state (initial state or state transition) was changed by randomly selecting a new state 
uniformly from the set of states. A response was perturbed by adding gaussian noise with 
standard deviation maximum O minimum . Since a response consisted of both a price and a quantity, 
both of these were perturbed. In the case that a state transition or response was changed, the 
particular transition edge to mutate was selected uniformly fr om all the state transitions. A 
new parse tree was created by randomly generating nodes until the tree was of size 6 (had 6 
nodes) . Crossover between parse trees involved randomly selecting a node in each tree and 
exchanging the subtrees rooted at those nodes. The trees on which to perform crossover were 
randomly selected uniformly from all the decider trees. 
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3.3.2.3 Neural-Automata Mutation 
The Neural-Automata mutation operator selected one of the mutation operators listed in 
table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Neural-Automata Mutation Operators 
Probability Mutation 
0.1 Change initial state 
0.1 Perturb initial response 
0.2 Change a state transition 
0.2 Change a response 
0.1 Mutate decider neural net 
0.1 Crossover decider neural nets 
0.1 Exchange decider neural nets 
0.1 Copy one decider neural net over another 
These mutation operators follow the same rules as those of GP-Automata. Crossover 
betR•een neural nets involved randomly selecting the indices of two edges within the neural 
nets and exchanging the values of the edges in between these. 
3.3.2.4 GP-Automata Crossover 
The GP-Automata mutation operator selected one of the crossover operators listed in table 
3.3. 
Table 3.3 GP-Automata Crossover Operators 
Probability Mutation 
0.2 Exchange initial states 
0.2 Exchange initial responses 
0.6 Exchange states 
If the "exchange states" operator was selected, two random indices were selected, and all 
states in between these indices were exchanged. 
3.3.2.5 Neural-Automata Crossover 
The Neural-Automata mutation operator selected one of the crossover operators listed in 
table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 Neural-Automata Crossover OAerators 
Probability Mutation 
0.2 Exchange initial states 
0.2 Exchange initial responses 
0.6 Exchange states 
If .the "exchange states" operator was selected, two random indices were selected, and all 
states in between these indices were exchanged. 
3.3.2.6 Fixed-Bid Initialization 
The two numbers constituting the fixed bids were initialized to a random number dis-
tributed uniformly over the possible range of each number. Price varied from 0 to 120, and 
quantity depended on the capacity limits of the generator. 
3.3.2.7 GP-Automata Initialization 
The FSM was initialized with 6 states. The initial response was initialized in the same 
manner as the fixed-bid representation. Each transition next state and response was initialized 
in the same manner as the initial state and transition. The decider parse tree was initialized 
to a random parse tree with 6 nodes. A sample parse tree is shown in figure 3.4. The nodes 
could be any of those shown in table 3.5. These nodes were inserted at random until a tree of 
size 6 was obtained. 
3.3.2.8 Neural-Automata Initialization 
The FSM was initialized in the same manner as the GP-Automata. The decider neural net 
was initialized to a random feed-forward neural net with two hidden layers. Each hidden layer 
had 3 nodes. The weights were initialized to random values distributed uniformly in the range 
[-1, 1J. 
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Table 3.5 Parse Zee Nodes 
Node Name Return 
Type 
Args Returns 
ITE if-then-else args 2 and 3 3 arg 2 if arg 1 is true; arg3 3 otherwise 
Odd odd Boolean 1 true if argl is odd, false otherwise 
Max maximum Real 2 maximum of args 1 and 2 
Min minimum Real 2 minimum of args 1 and 2 
ti negation Real 2 negation of arg 1 
Com complement Real 2 1 -arg 1 
> greater than Boolean 2 true if arg 1 > arg2; false otherwise 
>= greater than 
or equal to 
Boolean 2 true if arg 1 > arg2; false otherwise 
< less than Boolean 2 true if arg 1 < arg2; false otherwise 
<= less than 
or equal to 
Boolean 2 true if arg 1 < arg2; false otherwise 
+ add Real 2 arg 1 --~ arg 2 
- subtraction Real 2 arg 1 -arg 2 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
This chapter describes the experiments performed and the results obtained. 
4.1 Introduction 
The experiments performed were based on changing the variable parameters discussed in 
chapter 3. In the cases of co-evolution, all three of the representations were run and compared. 
In the cases of evolution by periodic immortalization, only the finite state automata were 
compared. 
Each experiment also shows the average bid and average fitness of the whole population 
versus generation of evolution. In most cases, a single run the algorithm is shown in addition 
to an average of many runs of the algorithm to demonstrate general behavior. 
The experiments were divided into two general cases: evolution by co-evolution and evo- 
lution by periodic immortalization. co-evolution has the potential to develop good strategies, 
but since fitness will not necessarily prove to be an effective measure of improvement of the 
strategies. Evolution by periodic immortalization, however, evolves the bidders against a set 
of fixed strategies after the first 1000 generations. Therefore, if the bidders axe learning bet-
ter bidding strategies, we should see the average fitness of a population increase with this 
evolutionary scheme. 
Unless stated otherwise, all experiments used a mutation rate of 0.5. Each figure shows the 
average fitness (labelled as "Fitness" ), average bid price {labelled as "Bid" ), average committed 
bid price (labelled as "Committed Bid" ; does not count bids that were taken in cycles that 
failed to meet the condition of price discovery), and equilibrium price (labelled as "Equilibrium 




The experiments described in this. section developed the bidders through co-evolution. 
These experiments tested all 3 representations, GP-Automata, Neural-Automata, and Fixed-
Bid. The Fixed-Bid equilibrium behavior in each case should give a decent approximation to 
expected theoretical behavior. In many cases it gives an equilibrium price higher than expected 
until ones takes into account the effect of market power on price. 
4.2.1 Experiment 1: Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price 
Table 4.1 Variations on Experiment 1 
Figures Bidders Demand Cost Curve / 
Min /Max 1 
Cost Curve / 
Min /Max 2 
4.1, 4.2, 4.3 10 2000 (0.00481 + 5.3q + 500} / (0.004q~ + 5.3q + 500} / 
100 / 300 100 / 300 
4.4, 4.5, 4.6 10 2000 ~ (0.00481 + 5.3q -~- 500} / (0.01281 ~- 15q + 1500) / 
100 / 300 200 / 500 
4.7, 4.8, 4.9 10 2000 (0.00481 + 5.3q + 500} / (0.004q`~ -{- 5.3q + 500) / 
200 / 500 200 / 500 
4.10, 4.11, 4.12 10 2000 {0.00481 + 5.3q + 500} / {0.01281 + 15q + 1500) / 
200 / 500 100 / 300 
4.13, 4.14, 4.15 ~ 4 800 (0.004q` + 5.3q + 500) / (0.00481 + 5.3q + 500} / 
100 / 300 100 / 300 
4.16, 4.17, 4.18 4 ~ 800 (0.00481 + 5.3q + 500} / {0.01281 + 15q + 1500) / 
_ 100 / 300 200 / 500 
4.19, 4.20, 4.21 4 800 (0.00481 + 5.3q + 500) / {0.00481 + 5.3q + 500) / 
200 / 500 200 / 500 
4.22, 4.23, 4.24 4 800 {0.00481 + 5.3q + 500) / (0.012q~ + 15q + 1500) j 
200 / 500 100 / 300 
This experiment used discriminatory pricing. Recall that with discriminatory pricing, each 
bidder, if it has a bid accepted, gets paid the price it listed in the bid. . Variations on the 
cost curves and capacity limits and number of bidders were explored. The different trials are 
shown in table 4.1. Each of the three figures listed refers to the graphed results of a particular 
representation (GP-Automata, Neural-Automata, Fixed-Bid}. "Cost Curve /Min /Max" 
refer to the cost curves and upper and lower capacity limits, respectively. In all cases, either 
a single cost curve and capacity limits were used for all bidders, or the population was split 
33 
into two groups, each of which had its own set of cost curves and capacity limits. In these 
cases, if there were 10 bidders, 7 of them would have Cost Curve 1 and Min/Max 1 capacity 
limits, and the other 3 would have Cost Curve 2 and Min/Max 2 capacity limits. If there were 
4 bidders, 2 of them would have Cost Curve 1 and Min/Max 1 capacity limits, and the other 2 
would have Cost Curve 2 and Min/Max 2 capacity limits. In the cases that every bidder had 
the same cost curve, these quantities are equal in table 4.1. 
Demand was set to be proportional to the number of bidders and to the average capacity 
limits of the bidders. The demand listed is the average demand, d, generated for each auction. 
The actual demand for each auction was drawn from a uniform probability distribution in the 
range [d — 
oi  
, d + 
ot
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Figure 4.1 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, 
GP-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
(0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500) / 100 / 300 
Figures 4.1 through 4.12 show four different cost curve and capacity limit choices for all 
three representations using the co-evolutionary fitness function and discriminatory pricing, 
with an auction size of 10 bidders. Examining the fixed-bid representation as a guide to the 
expected behavior of a market, a few general trends are evident. These trends are in place in 
the other two representations as well, although they appear amid the more complex behavior 
that the FS1V1's display. 
Not surprisingly, when the bidders have different cost curves, those with a higher cost curve 
get a lower fitness. Higher capacity limits lead to a lower equilibrium price. This is due to 
the demand (which is independent of the capacity limits of the bidders) being more easily met 
when the capacity limits are higher. Therefore more competition is present, driving the price 
down. 
Note that in the first figures 4.1 through 4.6, the GP-Automata and Neural-Automata 
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Figure 4.2 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, 
Neural-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
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Figure 4.3 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, Fixed-Bid, 
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Figure 4.4 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, 
GP-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
~0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 200 / 500 
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Figure 4.9 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, Fixed-Bid, 
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Figure 4.13 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, GP-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
(0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500) / 100 / 300 
Figures 4.13 through 4.24 show four different cost curve and capacity limit choices for 
all three representations using the co-evolutionary fitness function and discriminatory pricing, 
with an auction size of 4 bidders. 
The effects noted in section 4.2.1.1 are present here as well. Note, however, that the average 
equilibrium prices achieved are higher than those achieved with 10 bidders, if one compares 
figures 4.1 through 4.12 to figures 4.13 through 4.24, respectively (the cost curve and capacity 
limits are varied in the same order in this section as in section 4.2.1.1, so one may compare 
any figure n in this section to figure n — 12 in section 4.2.1.1). This illustrates the effect of the 
number of market participants on the market power of each individual market participant; i.e. 
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Figure 4.14 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, 
Neural-Automata, 4 Bidders, 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300 
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Figure 4.15 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, Fixed-Bid, 
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Figure 4.16 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, 
GP-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
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Figure 4.17 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, 
Neural-Automata, 4 Bidders. Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
(0.00482 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
~0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 200 / 500 
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Figure 4.18 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, Fixed-Bid, 
4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 
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Figure 4.19 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, GP-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
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Figure 4.20 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, 
Neural-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
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Figure 4.21 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, Fixed-Bid, 
4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 500 
























Figure 4.22 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, 
GP-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 500, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 









































Figure 4.23 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, 
1\eural-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
(0.00-1q2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 500, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
(0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 100 / 300 
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Figure 4.24 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Discriminatory Price, Fixed-Bid, 
4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max l: (0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 
500, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: (0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 100 / 300 
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4.2.2 Experiment 2: Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price 
Table 4.2 Variations on Experiment 2 
Figures Bidders Demand Cost Curve / 
Min/Mail 
Cost Curve / 
Min/Max2 
4.1, 4.2, 4.3 10 2000 (0.00481 + 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500) / (0.00481 + 5.3q + 500) 
100 / 300 
/ 
4.4, 4.5, 4.6 10 2000 (0.00481 + 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500) / ~ (0.01281 + 15q + 1500) 
200 / 500 
_ 
/ 
4.7, 4.8, 4.9 10 2000 (0.00481 + 5.3q 
200 i 500 
+ 500) / (0.00481 + 5.3q + 500) 
200 / 500 
/ 
4.10, 4.11, 4.12 10 2000 {0.00481 + 5.3q 
200 / 500 
+ 500} / ~0.012gl  + 15q + 1500) 
100 / 300 
/ 
4.13, 4.14, 4.15 4 800 (0.00481 + 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500} / (0.00481 + 5.3q + 500) 
100 / 300 
/ 
4.16, 4.17, 4.18 4 800 {0.004ql̀ +. 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500} / {0.01281 + 15q + 1500 
200 / 500 
/ 
4.19, 4.20, 4.21 4 800 (0.00481 + 5.3q 
200 / 500 
+ 500) / (0.00481 + 5.3q + 500) 
200 / 500 
_ 
/ 
4.22, 4.23, 4.24 4 800 (0.00481 + 5.3q 
200 / 500 
+ 500} / (0.01281 + 15q + 1500) 
100 / 300 
/ 
This experiment used uniform pricing. Recall that with uniform pricing, each bidder, if it 
has a bid accepted, gets paid the equilibrium price, or the price of the highest accepted bid. 
The rest of the details axe identical to those described in section 4.2.1. 
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Figure 4.25 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, GP-Automata, 
10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: (0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500) / 100 / 
300 
Figures -1.25 through 4.36 show four different cost curve and capacity limit choices for all 
three representations using the co-evolutionary fitness function and uniform pricing, with an 
auction size of 10 bidders. 
Comparing these results to those obtained with the same conditions except for using dis-
criminator• pricing, we see that on average, the equilibrium price and bids are lower under a 
uniform pricing scheme. This makes intuitive sense economically. When one's own bid price 
determines «•hether the bidder wins or not, and the bidder's payoff varies with the size of the 
bid. then there is a tradeoff. A lower bid, for instance, has a better chance of winning, but 
results in a lower payoff. However; under uniform pricing, one's own bid determines whether 
one «-ins or not, but has no effect on the bidder's payoff (unless it was the last accepted bid). 
Therefore the pressure to bid higher for a higher payoff is removed, and only the pressure to 





—bido leaoa T —ave0 






~ r ~~1,'~"'~~~,~~'~`~.~`~~~~f~.~,'Lk~~ 
~~a`~  ~"~ 's , 
"—b •,: ' — ~ 6000 ~ 
— eras 5000 





p _ ave8 
1~ ~i 
cD®T .-. 
~ N f~'~ v lryD ~ ~ Oy  ry ~ ~ to ~ ~i Oy 
bl~ ~D 
o ¢m7 a m 
op
~ ~ f•i 8 ~ ~ T ~ 
















— bidCorr>ri ifl 
p . 
— bidCom7 
_...... bidComB 0 
y~ ~+ q 
`~—' 7G ~ u°i-, ~ $S ~ o ~': m' ~ ~ ~ m bidCom9 ~' i'2 ~ ~ i$ ~ m ~' ~ m ~ ~ ~ wv ~' 
Figure 4.26 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Neu-
ral-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300 
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Figure 4.27 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Fixed-Bid, 10 
Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300 
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Figure 4.28 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, GP-Automata, 
10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: ~U.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 
300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: ~0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 200 / 500 
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Figure 4.30 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Fixed-Bid, 10 
Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 
300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: ~0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 200 / 500 
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Figure 4.31 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, GP-Automata, 
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Figure 4.32 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Neu-
ral-Automata, 10 Bidders. Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
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Figure 4.33 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Fixed-Bid. 10 
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Figure 4.34 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, GP-Automata, 
10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 
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Figure 4.35 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Neu-
ral-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 500, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
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Figure 4.36 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Fixed-Bid, 10 
Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 
500, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: ~0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 100 / 300 
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Figure 4.37 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, GP-Automata, 4 
Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: (0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300 
Figures 4.3 ~ through 4.48 show four different cost curve and capacity limit choices for all 
three representations using the co-evolutionary fitness function and uniform pricing, with an 
auction size of 4 bidders. 
The same effects that occurred moving from 10 to 4 bidders under the discriminatory 
pricing model (higher equilibrium price and bids) occur in the uniform pricing model. In some 
cases these effects are more pronounced. 
Curiously, comparing these results with those obtained under the same conditions under 
the discriminatory pricing scheme, we see that the uniform pricing scheme led to the same or 
higher equilibrium prices and bids than the discriminatory pricing. So it seems that uniform 
pricing «•ith 10 bidders lowered the price, but with only 4 bidders, the price-raising effect of 
market poK•er is much more pronounced in uniform pricing than in discriminatory pricing. The 
price-lov~•ering effect of uniform pricing is overcome by this compound effect. 
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Figure 4.38 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function; Uniform Price, 
Neural-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300 
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Figure 4.39 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Fixed-Bid, 4 Bid-
ders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300 
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Figure 4.40 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, GP-Automata, 4 
Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 
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Figure 4.41 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Neu-
ral-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 






Figure 4.42 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Fixed-Bid, 4 Bid-
ders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, 





Figure 4.43 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, GP-Automata, 4 
Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 500 
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Figure 4.44 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, 
Curve/Min/Max: Neural-Automata, 4 Bidders, 
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Figure 4.45 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Fixed-Bid, 4 Bid-
ders, Cost Curve/Min/Nlax: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 500 
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Figure 4.47 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, Uniform Price, Neu-
ral-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 500, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
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Figure 4.48 Co-Evolutionary Fitness Function, uniform Price, Fixed-Bid, 4 Bid-
ders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: ~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 200 / 500, 
Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: ~0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 100 / 300 
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4.3 Evolution by Periodic Immortalization 
The experiments described in this section developed the bidders through co-evolution for 
1000 generations. At that point, the best half of the population was immortalized, and the 
fitness function was thereafter measured by performance against the immortals. A set of the 
last 5 immortalized populations was maintained, and the fitness was determined by playing 
against all of these populations. Before 5 populations had been immortalized, the bidders 
simply played all the populations that had thus far been immortalized. Each of the following 
experiments continued evolution for 10000 generations, immortalizing the best half of the 
population every 1000 generations. 
These experiments used only the complex representations, GP-Automata and Neural-
Automata. The fixed-bid representation was not evolved. 
4.3.1 Experiment 3: Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price 
Table 4.3 Variations on Experiment 3 
Figures Bidders Demand Cost Curve / 
Min/Mail 
Cost Curve / 
Min/Max2 
4.5 ~ , 4.58 10 2000 (0.004q~ + 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500 / (0.00482 -}- 5.3q + 500 
100 / 300 
/ 
X3.59, 4.60 10 ~ 2000 (0.004q~ + 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500 / (0.01282 + 15q + 1500 
200 / 500 
/ 
4.61. 4.62 4 800 (0.004q~ ~- 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500) i (0.004q~ + 5.3q + 500 
100 / 300 
i 
4.63, 4.62 4 800 (0.004q~ + 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500 / (0.01282 -~ 15q -1-1500 
200 / 500 
/ 
This experiment used discriminatory pricing. Recall that with discriminatory pricing, each 
bidder, if it has a bid accepted, gets paid the price it listed in the bid. The rest of the details 
are identical to those described in section 4.2.1. 
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Figure 4.49 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, GP-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
(0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500) / 100 / 300 
Figures 4.49 through 4.52 show two different cost curve and capacity limit choices for 
the two finite-state automata representations using the immortalizing fitness function and 
discriminatory pricing, with an auction size of 10 bidders. 
The difference between these graphs, as in the co-evolutionary case, stems from the differ-
ence between the cost curves and capacity limits of the bidders. In each case, the population 
gradually improved in fitness (and the equilibrium price increased along with it) until about 
the 5000th generation, after which it levelled off. At this point, the equilibrium price actually 
began decreasing slightly. 
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Figure 4.50 Immortalized Population Fitness unction, Discriminatory 
Price, Neural-Automata. 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300 
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Figure 4.51 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, GP-Automata, 10 Bidders. Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
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Figure 4.52 Immortalized Population Fitness E~unction, Discriminatory 
Price, Neural-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max l: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
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Figure 4.53 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, GP-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
(0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300 
Figures 4.53 through 4.56 show two different cost curve and capacity limit choices for 
the two finite-state automata representations using the immortalizing fitness function and 
discriminatory pricing, with an auction size of 4 bidders. 
It is interesting to note that the effect of number of bidders on average equilibrium price 
(less bidders —; higher price) is not nearly as pronounced in the immortalizing fitness function 




























Figure 4.54 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, Neural-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
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Figure 4.55 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, GP-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
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Figure 4.56 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, Neural-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
~0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 200 / 500 
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4.3.2 Experiment 4: Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Uniform Price 
Table 4.4 Variations on Experiment 4 
Figures Bidders Demand Cost Curve / 
Min /Max 1 
Cost Curve / 
Min /Max 2 
4.57, 4.58 10 2000 {0.004q'~ + 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500 / (0.004q~ + 5.3q + 500 
100 / 300 
_ 
/ 
4.59, 4.60 10 2000 (0.00481 + 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500 / (0.012q~ + 15q + 1500 
200 / 500 
/ 
4.61, 4.62 4 800 (0.004q`~ -}-.5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500 / {0.004q~ + 5.3q + 500 
100 / 300 
/ 
4.63, 4.62 4 800 {0.00481 + 5.3q 
100 / 300 
+ 500 / (0.012q~ -~ 15q + 1500 
200 / 500 
/ 
This experiment used uniform pricing. Recall that with uniform pricing, each bidder, if it 
has a bid accepted, gets paid the equilibrium price, or the price of the highest accepted bid. 
The rest of the details axe identical to those described in section 4.2.1. 
72 
4.3.2.1 Auction Size 10 
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Figure 4.57 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, GP-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300 
Figures 4.57 through 4.60 show two different cost curve and capacity limit choices for the 
two finite-state automata representations using the immortalizing fitness function and uniform 
pricing, with an auction size of 10 bidders. 
These results differ remarkably from those of the discriminatory case. Whereas the discrim-
inatory pricing model led to gradual fitness and price increase, uniform pricing led to decrease 
in both fitness and price. Note that the fitness increases for the first 1000 generations, when 
the fitness function is co-evolutionary, and afterwards it decreases sharply at each replacement 
of the immortal bidders. 
Of course, the effect of differences in cost curves and capacity limits is still in place: those 
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Figure 4.58 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, Neural-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
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Figure 4.59 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, GP-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
/ 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
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~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 
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Figure 4.60 Immortalized Population Fitness F~.inction, Discriminatory 
Price, Neural-Automata, 10 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
~0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 200 / 500 
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4.3.2.2 Auction Size 4 
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Figure 4.61 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price. GP-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max: 
(0.00~g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300 
Figures 4.61 through 4.6~ show two different cost curve and capacity limit choices for the 
two finite-state automata representations using the immortalizing fitness function and »niform 
pricing, with an auction size of 4 bidders. 
Comparing these results to those in the case with 10 bidders, we see the usual effect: less 
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Figure 4.62 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, Neural-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Nlax: 
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Figure 4.63 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, GP-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost 'Curve/Min/Max 1: 
/ 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
500 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 
~0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 200 / 
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Figure 4.64 Immortalized Population Fitness Function, Discriminatory 
Price, Neural-Automata, 4 Bidders, Cost Curve/Min/Max 1: 
~0.004g2 + 5.3q + 500 / 100 / 300, Cost Curve/Min/Max 2: 
~0.012g2 + 15q + 1500 / 200 / 500 
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This research explored the adaptability of finite state automata to a simulated electric 
power market. The finite state automata were developed using a genetic algorithm. Two 
different types of finite state automata, GP-Automata and Neural-Automata, were tried, and 
their performance was compared to each other and to a third simplified representation that 
served as a baseline of comparison. 
5.1 Conclusions 
Recall that the difference between these two representations lies in the data processing 
structure used to compress the bandwidth of the input to the finite state machine. GP-
Automata used parse trees, and Neural-Automata used neural nets. The first conclusion 
to draw from the data in the previous chapter is that GP-Automata and Neural-Automata 
performed nearly the same _under all conditions. From this one can conclude that both a parse 
tree and a neural net are equally capable of processing the data received during rounds of 
bidding in an auction. 
The second conclusion to draw is that the finite state automata behaved, within reasonable 
limits, in ways similar to the baseline representation. In those cases in which the market 
outcome was dissimilar, the finite state automata achieved higher fitness than the baseline. 
Since the average fitness was higher for all populations, each of which represented one bidder 
in the auction, this indicates cooperation taking place between bidders in the auctions. 
Finally, though the fitness often changed during the course of evolution, this does not 
indicate exactly what is happening. With co-evolution especially, the average fitness going 
down does not necessarily mean the population is getting worse, and the average fitness going 
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up does .not necessarily mean the population is getting better. It only indicates performance 
of the agents relative to each other for the co-evolutionary case and relative to the immortal 
agents in the immortality fitness function case. 
~ . 2 ~.it ure Work 
The markets rules were not chosen arbitrarily, but neither were they unique. A single-sided 
auction was studied; future work could study adouble-sided auction. 
This research assumed that the cost of producing electricity by a multi-unit GENCO could 
be simplified as a single quadratic cost curve. This could be modified in the future to perform 
an explicit economic dispatch optimization once the quantity to be delivered is settled in the 
auction. 
This research considered only the day-ahead market used to determine allocation for the 
next day. It ignored the existence of forward markets on larger timescales (weekly, monthly, 
etc. } and the hourly spot market held the hour before delivery. Future research could explore 
these types of markets or develop strategies that make decisions for all of these timescales. 
The effectiveness of evolving finite state automata as learning agents was measured only 
relative to other evolved finite state automata. Future research could compare strategies 
developed through other learning mechanisms to these agents. One could also evolve the 
finite state automata in parallel with another learning algorithm, in order to determine which 
is more adaptable. 
In early runs of the experiments, the author conducted informal tests for the 1V~ayfield 
Ef,~ect. Recall that this is an effect observed by saving population members after the average 
fitness has converged, evolving the population for a Iong time, and playing the new population 
against the saved population. The Mayfield Effect occurs if the new population is able to 
achieve a higher fitness against the old population, despite the fact that they receive the same 
fitness playing within their own population. The effect is that of building general adaptive skills 
during evolution. The author's informal tests for this effect on the finite state machines being 
evolved to play electric power markets revealed that it was not present. Future work in this 
$1 
area would involve discovery of a representation or a method of evolving the representations 
used that is able to build up general adaptive features through evolution. 
The Neural-Automata representation has not been tried for any other genetic algorithm 
problems. mature research into this representation could test this representation on other 
problems that accommodate the use of finite state machines. Obvious test problems are those 
that have already been tried with GP-automata, such as simple economic games like Divide 
the Dollar (Ashlock97) or as control structures in simulated robots (Ashlock0l). 
The parse trees used in the GP-Automata took real numbers as input and hence, used real 
numbers as intermediate values during evaluation of the tree. Since limits were not placed 
on the possible connections between parse tree nodes, this means that a real number could 
potentially be fed into a Boolean input. Since booleans axe defined in terms of integers by 
the convention {0 =false, everything else =true), this could lead to every real being fed as 
a Boolean argument being evaluated as true, since the odds of getting a real exactly equal to 
0 axe infinitesimal. However, this does not preclude other data types, such as booleans and 
integers, still being fed as Boolean inputs, and so it will not prevent the Boolean functions from 
operating normally. Randomly generated trees will simply have a bias toward true values being 
fed to Boolean inputs. One potential way to correct this would be to implement a grammar 
to build the parse trees in which feeding real numbers as Boolean inputs would be disallowed. 
This work assumed that evolution would simply weed out those parse trees that use reals as 
booleans if they cause problems. 
A potential problem with using the output of a neural net as an array index is that there 
may be a bias toward the high and Iow numbered states. Since the sigmoid function used stays 
close to its upper-bounded or lower-bounded values for extreme values of the input, there is the 
possibility of the states 0 and (n-1} appearing more often. Evolution must simply find a way 
around this bias or use it. One potential way to eliminate this bias is to use a linear output 
node instead of a sigmoid. This, however, requires a way of limiting the output, since a linear 
transfer function is not bounded. In this work the sigmoid transfer function was kept on the 
output node on the assumption that any biases introduced would be either used or weeded out 
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by evolution. Fciture work wold find a way to eliminate this bias altogether. 
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APPENDIX Glossary 
auction A process, constrained by a set of rules, by which economic goods may be 
allocated and price paid for these goods determined. 
bandwidth compression Reduction of the resources needed to represent some data. 
co-evolutionary fitness function A fitness function that is dependent on members of 
the population besides the member being evaluated. 
crossover The exchange of subsets of representations between two population members 
of a genetic algorithm. 
discriminatory pricing Giving different winners in an auction different prices paid for 
goods. Contrast to uniform pricing. 
equilibrium price The intersection of the demand and supply curves on an economic 
price vs quantity graph. This is the theoretically predicted market price of a good. 
evolutionary algorithm An optimizing algorithm the mimics the biological process of 
Darwinian evolution find an optimal solution. 
evolutionarily stable A strategy that, given that it is in use across an entire co-evolving 
population, cannot be invaded by another strategy. 
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finite state machine A~ theoretical data processing structure. It takes input from 
some external source, changes its internal state in response to the input, and may or may not 
produce an output. The state change and output response are determined by a lookup table 
that enumerates all possible inputs. Also called a finite state automaton. 
fitness Aproblem-specific numerical measure of the optimality of a solution being de-
veloped b}• a genetic algorithm. 
fixed fitness function A fitness function that does not depend on other members of a 
population besides the member being evaluated. 
genetic algorithm An evolutionary algorithm that uses crossover. 
genetic programming A genetic algorithm that evolves parse trees. 
GP-automaton A modification of a classical finite state machine in which state change 
and output made in response to an input are determined by a parse tree having the input as 
leaf nodes. 
immortalizing fitness function A fitness function that relies on the genetic algo- 
rithm ''immortalizing" (saving) members of a population after some number of generations of 
evolution, and changing the fitness function to be dependent on competing with these fixed 
members. 
invade To overtake and replace another strategy in a co-evolving system. 
market clearing The process of translating the bids collected in a market auction into 
an allocation of the goods from sellers to buyers. 
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Mayfield efFect The effect observed when a population evolves for a very long time 
with no apparent change in fitness, but is able to build up general skills in achieving high 
fitness. The effect may be demonstrated by picking two populations from generations after 
the fitness converged and playing them aga'nst each other. If the effect is present, the more 
evolved population should win. 
mutation The random perturbation of a population member in an evolutionary algo-
rithm. 
Nash equilibrium A set of strategies assigned to all players in an economic game having 
the property that if any player unilaterally changes its strategy, it will lower its payoff. 
neural-automata A modification of a classical finite state machine in which state change 
and output made in response to an input are determined by a neural net having the input as 
nodes in the input layer. 
neural net A set of connected neurons, each of takes multiple inputs and produces one 
output. The neural net as a whole takes multiple inputs and produces a single output. Also 
called artificial neural net. 
optimal power flow Given a set of electricity-generating units, the quantity of electricity 
that each must produce to minimize the total cost of production across all generators. 
parse tree A tree data structure used to store mathematical formulas. 
population-based stochastic search algorithm A stochastic search algorithm in 
which a set (population) of potential solutions is developed, with some rule determine how 
many solutions to perturb at each iteration, and some rule determining which solutions to keep 
and which to discard. An evolutionary algorithm with no crossover is a type of population-
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based stochastic search algorithm. 
single tournament selection A model of evolution used in genetic algorithms in which 
the population is split into groups of four, and the best two members of the group mate, and 
their children replace the other two members. 
stochastic search algorithm An optimizing algorithm that begins with a random 
potential solution to a problem, randomly perturbs it slightly, and replaces the original with 
the perturbed version if the perturbed version is more optimal. 
uniform pricing Giving different winners in an auction a single price paid for goods. 
Contrast to discriminatorg pricing. 
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